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THE ROLE OF LAW IN SECURING EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LEGAL
POWERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
HERBERT HILL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic events in Watts, the Negro ghetto of Los Angeles,
are indicative of the fundamental alienation of working class Negroes
from the entire society. This alienation is profound and is rooted in
the most significant source of identity for western man—work. As the
violent activity in Watts continued and expanded it became evident
that in its most significant aspect it was a revolt against the inability
of Negroes to acquire meaningful and satisfactory jobs.' Related to
this is their inability to obtain the rewards not only of wages but also
of status—the status that is directly related to holding meaningful
and productive jobs. Thus, the Negroes who revolted in Watts and
elsewhere were not only the long-term unemployed, but also the un-
deremployed and the working poor as well as the significant number
of young Negroes who have never entered into the labor force. Freud's
observation that "work is the chief means of binding an individual to
reality" has a clear relation to the condition of life of the Negro wage
earner in the slum ghettos of the urban North. The affluence of Amer-
ican society is visible at every turn and the disparity between the white
American reality and the Negro American reality is extremely vivid
to the Negro at precisely that moment that it is most obscure to the
white man.
The enactment of federal civil rights laws and the emergence of
a new body of constitutional law that voids segregation statutes, to-
gether with the adoption of state anti-discrimination acts and the
issuance of executive orders constitutes an important element of prog-
* Labor Secretary, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
Faculty member, New School for Social Research.
1 Official sources indicate that the rate of unemployment among Negroes in the
Watts area of Los Angeles in the period immediately preceding the riots during the
summer of 1965 was 34%. This figure exceeded the general rate of unemployment during
the Great Depression of the 1930's which was between 22 and 26%.
The rate of unemployment as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is based
upon the number of persons in the labor force actively seeking work. Unfortunately,
official figures do not include the significant number of unemployed persons who have
been driven out of the labor force as a result of long-term joblessness and who are no
longer seeking employment. Thus, many thousands of older Negroes who have exhausted
their unemployment insurance benefits as well as a large but undetermined number of
young persons who have never entered the labor market in the first instance, are not
included in official unemployment statistics which are regarded by many economists as
a systematic understatement of true unemployment conditions. The problem of the
"hidden unemployed" is especially acute in Negro slum ghettos.
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ress. However, despite this, the Negro's quest for economic justice—
for job equality—remains unfulfilled. There is now a terrible irony:
As the Negro achieves legal equality, he is experiencing an economic.
crisis that threatens the realization of the legal victories.
Outbreaks of violence in many communities must be understood
within the context of a growing economic crisis in the major urban
centers of Negro population concentration. The great mass of Negroes
are locked in a permanent condition of poverty. This includes the
long-term unemployed as well as the working poor, who know only
a marginal economic existence and thus increasingly are forced into
the ranks of the unemployed. If the traditional patterns of job
discrimination are not rapidly eliminated, the growing crisis of unem-
ployment and poverty among Negroes threatens to plunge Negro com-
munities into further alienation and despair.
The economic well-being of the entire Negro community is ad-
versely affected by the generations of enforced overconcentration of
Negro wage earners in unskilled and menial job classifications in the
industrial economy. As a consequence, Negro workers are thus more
vulnerable to displacement due to technological change than any other
group in the labor force. A continuation of this pattern will cause even
greater crisis in the years to come unless fundamental and rapid
changes take place in the occupational characteristics and mobility of
Negro labor in the United States.
Negro workers are denied job opportunities even in expanding
areas of the labor market such as the building and construction trades
industry which could be an important source of new employment for
Negroes and members of other minority groups.' Unfortunately the
skilled craft unions affiliated to the AFL-CIO continue to maintain
the traditional practice of excluding non-whites from craft occupations.
These labor unions, through their control of apprenticeship training
programs and by exclusive hiring hall agreements with the major
building contractors, have obtained the power to exclude Negroes
from job opportunities in both public and private construction
projects.3 The United States Government has significantly failed to
enforce Federal Executive orders prohibiting widespread discrimina-
tory practices by labor unions and employers in the construction indus-
try as well as in other areas of the economy.
2 On December 13, 1965, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that outlays
for new construction would reach an all-time high of about $72.7 billion in 1966. Time
Magazine, Dec. 17, 1965, p. 88, reported that "labor pirating by firms has broken out
in the Midwest as a result of shortages of ironworkers, carpenters and cement masons."
8 For data on the racial discriminatory practices of building trades unions, see
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report on Employment 128-31 (1961); Hill, Racism
Within Organized Labor, J. of Negro Educ. 109-18 (No. 2 1961); Hill, "The Racial
Practices of Organized Labor—The Age of Gompers and After," Employment, Race and
Poverty (Ross & Hill ed. 1966).
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The adoption of civil rights laws and the issuance of Executive
orders prohibiting discrimination in employment, together with the anti-
poverty program, now promise a new and better future for Negroes.
Because the need for hope among Negroes is so great, the promise be-
comes all the more vivid. But as the promise and the hope fail to
materialize and as the racial situation remains the same for the ma-
jority of Negroes, the despair and alienation becomes more profound.
It is increasingly evident that the continued deterioration of the
Negro's economic status can nullify the historic civil rights gains won
in the courtrooms and legislative halls during the past twenty years.
For this reason, the need to establish the constitutional right to equal
employment without regard to considerations of race and color now
assumes a new urgency involving the basic national interest. Although
the Supreme Court has not ruled that an employer or labor union is
constitutionally required to refrain from discriminatory racial prac-
tices, the Court has approached the issue in several important cases
during the past quarter of a century. For example, in J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB,' the Court held that a union certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the collective bargaining agent was required by
statute to represent all workers in the appropriate employee bargain-
ing unit. In this regard the Supreme Court stated in a later case that:
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory
representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform
the duty, which is inseparable from the power of representa-
tion conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership
of the craft. While the statute does not deny to such a bar-
gaining labor organization the right to determine eligibility
to its membership, it does require the union, in collective
bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier, to repre-
sent non-union or minority union members of the craft with-
out hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith. Wherever necessary to that end, the union is required
to consider requests of non-union members of the craft and
expressions of their views with respect to collective bargain-
ing with the employer and to give to them notice of and op-
portunity for hearing upon its proposed action.' (Emphasis
added.)
Despite frequent exposure and criticism of discriminatory prac-
tices by many labor unions, "guilty unions," as one commentator has
written, "are being certified as exclusive bargaining agents, protected
from attack by other unions or groups of dissident employees, and
4 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
5 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
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are having their unfair labor practice complaints treated as though
they were advancing the public interest."' Thus, Leo Weiss, an attorney
for the NLRB, contends that unions engaging in discriminatory racial
practices are not entitled to the governmental protection given to
unions through federal statute. By continuing to provide labor unions
with such protection, Weiss claims that the federal government violates
the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
II. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
Significant action on the issue of the Negro and employment dis-
crimination begins with the case of Steele v. Louisville & In
this 1944 case the Supreme Court for the first time proclaimed that
governmental protection for minorities against discrimination by labor
unions was constitutional. In Steele, it had been charged that the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, the union that functioned as
exclusive bargaining agent under the terms of the Railway Labor Act,
refused to admit Negroes to membership and also sought to have the
railroad management replace Negro labor with white workers who
were eligible for union membership.' The Court ruled that injunctive
relief and damages were available to Negro firemen because of the
union's breach of duty toward them. The Court held that while
the Railway Labor Act gave power to make binding contracts, it did
not authorize the union to violate the interests of certain members of
the craft to the benefit of others:
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the
statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty
to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft
as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal
protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates... .
We hold that the language of the Act .. 1 expresses the aim
of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of
a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the
power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it
acts, without hostile discrimination against them.'
The Court held that while the act did not expressly provide for fair
and impartial representation, a mandate to act fairly could be drawn
from interstices of the act.
6 Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 50 Geo.
L.J. 457, 458 (1962).	 .
7 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In a related case, Turista v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), the Court arrived at a similar decision.
8 323 U.S. at 196.
9 Id. at 202-03.
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Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing
a labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft, to represent
the craft, did not intend to confer plenary power upon the
union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of
the minority of the craft, without imposing on it any duty
to protect the minority. Since petitioner and the other Negro
members of the craft are not members of the Brotherhood or
eligible for membership, the authority to act for them is de-
rived not from their action or consent .but wholly from the
command of the Act.'
Thus was created the concept that a union acting as an exclusive
bargaining agent and operating under auspices of a federal statute,
owes its entire constituency the duty of equal protection. In this case,
moreover, Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring separately, viewed the
issue in a different manner. In his view, economic discrimination
against Negroes practiced under the guise of congressional authority
was constitutionally prohibited so that to read the statute in a way
which would authorize discrimination would, in effect, make the statute
unconstitutional. Thus, although the act "contains no language which
directs the manner in which the bargaining representative shall per-
form its duties. . . . I am willing to read the statute as not permitting
or allowing any action by the bargaining representative in the exercise
of its delegated powers which would in effect violate the constitutional
rights of individuals."" Justice Murphy viewed the "utter disregard
for the dignity and well-being of colored citizens"' as a condition
demanding "the invocation of constitutional condemnation"" and he
stated that economic discrimination should be met with constitutional
disapproval whenever applied "under authority of law."" For the first
time, therefore, a Supreme Court Justice declared that a union which
owes its status as exclusive bargaining agent to a federal statute
violates the Constitution when it discriminates against a minority
group it is supposed to represent. While the Court majority found the
duty of fair representation in the commands of the statute, Mr. Justice
Murphy believed that because the union operated under delegated
authority from Congress, it had a duty to comply with the same con-
stitutional standards imposed upon Congress, and since Congress is
precluded from authorizing discriminatory action on the basis of
race, so too are labor unions.
In its next major decision, Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
10 Id. at 199.
11 Id. at 208-09.
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Firemen," the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from enjoining racial dis-
crimination by a union. A labor union, as bargaining agent for both
Negro and white employees, had negotiated an agreement with a car-
rier to set up two classifications for workers: promotable and non-
promotable. All non-promotable workers were Negro. The conse-
quences of this system if carried out as intended were clear: all
Negroes would eventually be eliminated from employment. The Court
was certain that because the union derived its authority as bargaining
agent from a federal statute and therefore was the beneficiary of a fed-
eral grant of power, it could not abuse its position to deprive Negro
workers of their rights. Thus, racial minorities subjected to discrimina-
tory practices were allowed to sue labor unions, and the courts re-
tained their injunctive power to protect the Negro worker.
The inference of this decision is that even if a prohibitive pro-
vision does not expressly exist in the statute in question, a require-
ment of fair representation must be operative. If it were not, it could
be inferred that Congress had given unions unlimited power, including
authorization to misrepresent employees—a power which would deny
workers the right to obtain legal remedies to limit its abuse or to seek
redress of their just grievances.
The most far reaching extension of the Steele doctrine by the
Court occurred in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard." Even
though the Negro workers who were discriminated against were not
members of the discriminating union, nor employed in the same craft,
nor represented by the same defendant union in collective bargaining
procedures, the Steele doctrine was applied. White workers constituting
two separate unions for collective bargaining purposes, did identical
work for the railroad. The whites, however, were called "brakeman"
and the Negroes "train porters." After resisting repeated efforts of the
white union to eliminate Negro workers from employment, the com-
pany finally signed a new contract with that union which switched the
work to whites and consequently notified the Negro train porters that
their services were no longer required. Thus, the union's agreement, if
consummated, would, in effect, have eliminated the position of train
porter on the railroads.
At first the case seemed different from Steele, since the brake-
men's union could not be charged with discriminating against a
craft minority which it was statutorily required to represent fairly
(since porters were not a member of the craft). But Mr. Justice Black
concluded:
15 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
10 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
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Since the Brotherhood has discriminated against "train por-
ters" instead of minority members of its own "craft," it is
argued that the Brotherhood owed no duty at all to refrain
from using its statutory bargaining power so as to abolish
the jobs of the colored porters and drive them from the rail-
roads. We think this argument is unsound and that the opin-
ion in the Steele case points to a breach of statutory duty by
this Brotherhood.
As previously noted, these train porters are threatened
with loss of their jobs because they are not white and for no
other reason. The job they did hold under its old name would
be abolished by the agreement; their color alone would dis-
qualify them for the old job under its new name. The end
result of these transactions is not in doubt; for precisely the
same reasons as in the Steele case "discriminations based on
race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Congress
plainly did not undertake to authorize the bargaining repre-
sentative to make such discriminations." . .. The Federal
Act thus prohibits bargaining agents it authorizes from using
their position and power to destroy colored workers' jobs
in order to bestow them on white workers. And courts can
protect those threatened by such an unlawful use of power
granted by a federal act."
Mr. Justice Minton, along with Justices Vinson and Reed, dis-
sented. They stated that since train porters were not entitled to repre-
setita.tion by the Brotherhood, as the Negros were not classified as
brakemen, the case should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable. In
their view, the union did not owe the same obligation of fair repre-
sentation to workers not in the collective bargaining unit. They looked
upon the union's dealing with such workers as those of a private asso-
ciation, not subject to federal requirements to refrain from discrimina-
tion. These Justices believed that the majority sought to invalidate
the contract not because the porters are brakemen entitled to fair
representation, but because they are Negroes discriminated against
at the behest of the union Brotherhood. They held that private parties
may discriminate on grounds of race, and thus argued that the decision
of the majority was illegal.
Circuit court decisions subsequent to Howard retreated from Mr.
Justice Black's majority decision. In Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 18
Negro cab drivers seeking to enjoin execution of a discriminatory con-
tract entered into by their employer and the Teamsters Union were
17 Id. at 773.
18 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952).
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denied relief. The contract limited Negroes to driving in Negro dis-
tricts of Pittsburgh and also gave Negroes undesirable assignments.
The Third Circuit opinion cited Steele, noting that unions acting under
a federal statute must fairly represent men in their units. But it denied
that the union acted under a federal law, although it functioned under
an NLRB certification. The court claimed that the union's authority to
act as a bargaining agent pre-dated federal statutes and was dependent
upon voluntary membership. Holding that the Negro members had
voluntarily joined the union and that they did so not under compulsion
or as the result of a federal law, the court concluded that no federal
law was involved and that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed. It
thus ignored the implications of past Supreme Court decisions which
indicated that there was an implicit underlying federal policy to pre-
vent racial discrimination by unions. In fact, had the Supreme Court
taken the same view as the Third Circuit, the previously discussed
cases would have been dismissed, since none depended upon compulsion
to join a union. Nevertheless, the Supreme, Court denied certiorari
in this case."
The Williams case was relied upon by both the district court and
the Court'of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as authority for its decision
in Syres v. Oil Workers." In this case two locals belonging to the same
International Union, one white and the other Negro, agreed to bargain
with their employer through a single negotiating committee. The com-
mittee negotiated a contract containing segregated seniority lines,
thus preventing the advancement of Negro workers to the more de-
sirable jobs held by whites only. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal, finding that no federal statute or constitutional pro-
vision was involved. The action was seen as only a breach of agree-
ment between two locals, involving no statutory or constitutional pro-
vision on which to predicate jurisdiction.
Judge Rives, dissenting, argued that the action of the federal
authority actually is involved when a contract is imposed, since the
bargaining unit is given exclusive rights by the NLRB, which holds
an election and certifies the winning union as exclusive agent under
the Taft-Hartley Act. Both employer and union then bargain with
each other, and the Board is empowered to compel such action. In
effect, Judge Rives argued, the Government haS taken part, since it
is the Government that gives to the majority union the right to act
for all workers in the unit, and thus imposes on the agent the duty
not to abuse its status by practicing racial discrimination.
By 1955 it had been established that both the Railway Labor Act
and the National Labor Relations Act did carry safeguards against
19 346 U.S. 840 (1963).
20 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
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discrimination by unions which functioned under these statutes. Yet
it seemed, on the basis of Williams and Syres, that unions did not
have the same obligations toward workers not under their immediate
jurisdiction. This problem was surmounted when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Syres and reversed the judgment of the circuit
court in a one sentence per curiam opinion citing Steele and Howard
as precedent.' It was now established as law that racial discrimination
by unions against workers would be treated the same way whether
arising under the Railway Labor Act or under the National Labor
Relations Act. Yet, when this case was subsequently tried under the
new theory, a verdict for the defendant was upheld on the ground
that the plaintiff Negro workers had failed to prove damage to them-
selves as individuals. 22
Two years later the Supreme Court extended the union's obliga-
tion in Conley v. Gibson23
 and ruled that discrimination was pro-
hibited not only in execution of collective bargaining agreements, but
in handling of grievances under the contract. The union had refused
to oppose the employer's removal of Negro workers and replacement
by whites, and had failed to act upon discharged workers' complaints
through established grievance machinery. The Court held that the
union's failure to process the grievances was a good and proper cause
for litigation.
The following year, however, the Supreme Court refused to re-
view a decision of the Sixth Circuit dismissing a complaint by Negro
firemen seeking union membership. In Oliphant v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen," several Negro firemen, employed by southern
railroads, brought suit to compel the Brotherhood to admit them to
membership. The union was recognized as their bargaining agent under
the Railway Labor Act, and they alleged that it negotiated contractual
provisions which, because of their race, resulted in loss of income to
them. The district court had found discrimination in union representa-
tion and conditions of employment. It agreed that if such practices
had been due to federal action they would have been unconstitutional,
but that certification as exclusive bargaining agent by the federal
government was not sufficient to make the union's conduct the equiv-
alent of federal action.'
The court of appeals accepted dismissal of the complaint adding
that "the Brotherhood is a private association, whose membership
policies are its own affair, and this is not an appropriate case for inter-
21 Syres V. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
22 Syres V. Oil Workers, 257 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929
(1959).
23 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
24 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958).
25 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
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position of judicial control."' Certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court, which noted that the refusal to review was based upon the
"abstract context" in which the questions sought to be raised were
presented by the record. 27 Thus, in this case, the appeals court had
articulated the view that the Railway Labor Act did not confer
upon members the rights of "voice and vote" within the union which
gave them an advantage in scope of control over the union as against
those Negroes denied membership. The advantages gained by the white
union members, so the appeals court held, derive from private rights
under the union constitution, and are not conferred by federal law.
The Supreme Court must have agreed with the district court
that there was no merit in the argument that denial of union member-
ship in a certified bargaining representative was per se a deprivation
of equal protection of laws under the due process clause. Yet, there
was no "abstract context" in the record in regard to the fifth amend-
ment claim to lead them to hesitate. Nor was there lack of evidence
needed to sustain the argument they rejected—that denial of "voice
and vote" within the union violated the Steele doctrine in that it was
deprivation of equal representation. The only contention remaining
open to a charge that was "abstract" was in claiming that admission to
membership was a remedy under circumstances in which actual dis-
crimination occurred. Thus, the Supreme Court evidently agreed with
the lower tribunals that it could not be said "definitely that this
Brotherhood adopted these practices for the purpose of discriminating
against the Negroes."28 Barring evidence that actual discrimination
in representation had taken place, the Supreme Court could not con-
sider granting the relief requested by the Negro plaintiffs.
Thus, under a "proper" record, the Court might have been willing
to order union membership as a remedy to alleviate discrimination.
In fact, their denial of certiorari in Oliphant is consistent with the
analysis of their decision in Howard. The Court said, in effect, that
the evidence of racial discrimination present in Steele and Howard
was absent in Oliphant. It suggested that had the record been clear,
it might have ordered admission to membership as a remedy on the
ground that this would afford relief from continuing discrimination.
The Supreme Court also hinted in Oliphant that it would welcome re-
viewing in some other case the basic constitutional question: whether
a union has a right to restrict membership because of race.
The restricted view of federal action expressed by the lower courts
in this case has not been entirely accepted. Moreover, the opinion is
held by some authorities to mean that union discrimination is forbidden
26 262 F.Zd at 363.
27 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
28 262 F,2d at 361.
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not only under statutes, but under the fifth amendment due process
clause as well. As Leo Weiss points out, "there can be little dispute that
racial minorities may use the federal courts for redress of discrimina-
tory practices imposed upon them by labor unions acting under the
Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act.""
The major point to consider is that while Congress has not spe-
cifically provided an administrative remedy for the protection of
minorities against discrimination by a labor union or an employer,
their failure has not stood in the way of the Court granting judicial
protection. Court doctrine holds that when a union is given authority
over the employee's welfare by Congress, it must exercise that au-
thority without discriminating in the process. A labor union cannot
expect to gain the preferred status granted by the authority of federal
law, and then commence to engage in a racially discriminatory pattern
of conduct. Unions have become, in effect, public bodies and are no
longer private "voluntary associations," free to segregate and dis-
criminate at will. Thus, an injured Negro worker may resort to the
federal courts to gain redress of grievances.
III. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The suggestion has recently been made that federal agencies such
as the NLRB may directly aid the Negro worker in his battle against
union discrimination. Some have argued that when a federal agency is
not directly involved in causing discrimination, that no violation of the
Bill of Rights occurs. However, an agency such as the NLRB lends
itself to the effectuation of illegal discrimination when it provides
valuable services and legal protection to a discriminating union.
The NLRB does not directly encourage or enforce discrimination.
Discriminatory acts are those of employers or labor unions, not of the
Board. Thus, even those who recognize that the NLRB is prohibited
from discriminating see the question of the right of a private associa-
tion, i.e., the union, to proclaim its own membership policies which are
not governed by the Constitution. In this view it is held that direct
action of a government agency would constitute a violation of the
Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court, when faced with such a problem, has
sought to find the practical, as distinct from the abstract, effect of the
Government's action. This is noted in Shelley v. Kraemer," in which
an effort was made to uphold court enforcement of a racial covenant
contained in a deed of real property. In this case the discrimination
was originated by private parties who were legally free to do so. No
state action was involved. Therefore, judicial enforcement of private
29 Weiss, op. cit. supra note 6, at 468.
3° 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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agreements requiring racial restriction did not, it was argued, consti-
tute unlawful racial discrimination. The Court was requested, on the
basis of this argument, to enforce an agreement in which private
parties had legally entered.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning, and ruled that
the act of a court was as much state action: as the act of a legislature.
The judicial branch was not entitled to impose a racially discrimina-
tory system upon real property, even while enforcing contracts of
private parties. The Court held that enforcement of restrictions
based on race was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The covenant itself was not invalid. Rather,
the participation of the state, through the courts, rendered the scheme
unconstitutional.
Thus, to allow unions, whose conduct embodies the characteristics
of governmental action by virtue of certification and statutory pro-
tection, to engage in racially discriminatory policies and practices,
means to ignore the broad implications of the Shelley decision. Union
discrimination cannot be distinguished from other forms of anti-Negro
practices simply because the discrimination lacks specific governmental
sanction. The state was prohibited to act in Shelley because it was only
by obtaining the support of the state that private parties would have
been able to effectively discriminate. Unions have been empowered
by the state to exercise great control over individuals, and over entire
classes of workers. Without statutory protection, they would have
either no power or limited power to discriminate. The effect is that
although they are not specifically given the right to discriminate
racially, they have been given powers by the state which makes it
possible for them to discriminate against Negro workers. Thus, dis-
crimination by labor unions may well be regarded as a form of state
action under the Shelley doctrine.
It is therefore argued by civil rights advocates that private parties
may not use the power of the state to bring about conditions which
would subvert the use of such power by accomplishing objectives for-
bidden to the state by the fourteenth amendment. In Shelley the private
parties seeking to enforce the covenant did not become "state instru-
mentalities" merely because they sought to invoke the power of the
courts to gain their objective. Rather, they remained private citizens
who attempted to use the state power to perform a function forbidden
to it.
The decision in Shelley establishes that no agency of the United
States Government can constitutionally take part in enforcing a
racially discriminatory plan, even though it was originated by private
parties, such as labor unions. As Judge Pope argued in NLRB v.




I think the last chapter on this question has not been
written. When Shelley v. Kraemer . . . held that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibited state courts from enforcing
restrictive covenants based on race or color, the Court in
Hurd v. Hodge . . . declared such covenants equally unen-
forecable in the federal courts. . . . A union which practices
racial discrimination as a practical matter carries its policy
into its collective bargaining agreements. It is a nice question
whether the Labor Board may recognize or enforce such an
agreement any more than a federal court may lend its aid to
a racial restrictive covenant.'
If Congress is forbidden to legislate racial discrimination, and
the courts are forbidden to enforce discriminatory measures originated
by private parties, then an administrative agency cannot protect such
discriminatory practices either. The logical conclusion to the decisions
in Steele and Shelley is that the Negro worker may certainly look to
the NLRB for protection. For in Steele, the Court asked if the Govern-
ment had delegated to private parties such enormous power so that
the welfare of many other social groups was affected. In Shelley, they
asked if participation of a government agency was necessary to make
a discriminatory scheme work. If the answer to both is yes, then the
actions of the private party which discriminates must be subjected to
judicial scrutiny and eventual prohibition.
Thus, in seeking to determine whether the NLRB has the power
to intervene on the Negro worker's behalf, one must judge whether or
not it does give the union equal authority over all employees and
whether its operations are vital to the effectuation of a discriminatory
scheme. If the answer is that it does, then the judicial precedents per-
taining to the Railway Labor Act cases and other cases involving pri-
vate parties also apply to the administrative agency of the NLRB.
The NLRB performs its functions in two basic ways. The first
established procedure is the unfair labor practice charge with remedial
orders; the other is the designation of a majority union as exclusive
bargaining representative of a group of employees. Section 8 of the act
contains anti-discrimination provisions of a general nature. If an
employee is unfairly denied membership in a union and this results
in loss of employment, lower wages, earlier layoff, reduced seniority
or inability to find work, etc., the union and employer have committed
unfair labor practices and NLRB weapons may be used by the worker
who files a charge. Remedial measures include reinstatement with
back pay and compensation for financial loss suffered as a result of
discrimination.
31
 218 F.2d 913, 917 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
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Yet, the Board can only protect a worker's job, and cannot compel
his acceptance into union memmbership. Aside from the reluctance
of government agencies to require private bodies to admit applicants
to membership, the act contains one provision which seems to prevent
the NLRB from doing so. Section 8(b) (1) (A) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
... (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this para-
graph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership . . . 32
The limitation of the provision to unfair labor practice charges pro
vides remedies for employees who have been , prevented from joining a
labor union and are seeking to protect their jobs because of lack of
union membership. When a Negro worker is permitted to join a union,
he may still be subject to unequal treatment in several forms, such
as wage differentials, separate racial seniority lists, inability to enter
apprenticeship training programs and other discriminatory treatment.
However, until recently such discrimination was not considered an
unfair labor practice.
When a union files a petition with the NLRB seeking recognition
as a majority representative of employees in a bargaining unit, and
when it requests certification to this effect, the NLRB has a direct
concern with the union's activities, including its racial practices. The
NLRB investigates the union's claims, then a hearing is held to deter-
mine if a basis exists for holding an election. When sufficient grounds
are established, the NLRB holds an election at its own expense and
certifies the result. If the union wins, it is certified as exclusive col-
lective bargaining agent; a new election is prohibited for at least a
year; and when the union and the employer sign a contract, no election
may be held for an additional two years. Thus, the "contract bar" can
operate for a three year period and legally "freezes" rank and file
workers within the union.
During this period both management and the union are required
to bargain collectively. The employer may not bargain with any other
union, individual or private groups of workers. He may not interfere
with the union's relations with workers or coerce and restrain them.
He also may not discriminate against union members. Similarly,
the worker is restricted in the nature of his private dealings with the
employer. He cannot, for example, strike without complying with the
32 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), as amended, 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
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procedural requirements of the act or be required to join another union
as a condition of employment.
Thus, an elaborate system of legal protection for the union has
been established and any union which demonstrates its majority stand-
ing is sheltered by the protective arrangement. One must then ask
whether Congress has given the exclusive bargaining agent so much
direct power over employees without meaning to impose the concur-
rent obligation to act without discrimination on the basis of race. The
Supreme Court, in fact, answered this question when it cited Steele"
and Howard" in reversing the appeals court decision in Syres." In
making the union the exclusive spokesman for the worker, in compelling
union membership when there is a union security agreement, in
protecting the union against "raids" from other unions for a period of
time, and in prohibiting individual bargaining, Congress has given the
established union great powers over the welfare of large groups of
workers.
The question next becomes one of whether the NLRB's function
in collective bargaining does contribute to the effectuation of racial
discrimination in a manner that violates the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. We note that the NLRB provides election and
certification machinery, which results in designation of the union as
the exclusive bargaining agent. Its vital facilities are available for use
against "raiding" unions and against employers who refuse to recognize
the legitimate bargaining agent. If a legal union security agreement
exists, the Board effectively protects the union against defections by
dissatisfied workers and the union may call on the NLRB to sustain
its power. Thus, the NLRB and other government agencies participate
in several decisive ways in the enforcement of discriminatory schemes.
It is no longer questionable that discriminatory practices by labor
unions operating under federal statutes involve constitutional issues. A
worker injured in this process has a cause of action in federal courts
for a declaratory judgment, damages and an injunction. Conversely,
an argument has been developed that the decision in Shelley denies to
unions access to the courts for the judicial enforcement of a racially
discriminatory labor contract. And this theory is applicable to the
regulation and protection of unions by the NLRB under the National
Labor Relations Act. As Leo Weiss writes, "it becomes clear that the
NLRB is without power to certify a labor union which engages in
racial discrimination or to provide such a union with the protections
normally furnished to exclusive bargaining representatives under the
33 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 7.
34
 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, supra note 16.
35 Byres v. Oil Workers, supra note 21.
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National Labor Relations Act.' Thus, the NLRB is limited in further-
ing the exercise of power by a union which practices racial dis-
crimination.
In several recent cases," the NLRB takes the position that it
has both the power and the duty to protect workers from discrimination
by unions which are their exclusive bargaining agents. It has rejected
union requests to exclude Negroes from the bargaining unit because
of race; it has questioned (before the Taft-Hartley Act) whether a
closed shop agreement could be given effect when coupled with denial
of membership on racial grounds; it has announced its agreement to
withhold certification if a union discriminated against workers in a
unit; and it has found that a union which established a separate local
for Negro workers abused its status by compelling membership on be-
half of the uncertified local. In the case of Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., a majority of the Board went further than it had in the past
and held, according to Sanford Jay Rosen, that "unions are under
affirmative obligation to oppose discrimination by employers in terms
and conditions of employment.'
For the NLRB to significantly increase its effectiveness, the courts
must finally decide the basic constitutional issue involved. It must be
made explicit in the law that Congress cannot clothe a racist union
with authority to determine the status of workers on the basis of race
and that no government agency can lend its aid, to enforcement of
a discriminatory system of operations. The Taft-Hartley Act in 1947
contained requirements that unions file reports of activities and that
its officers sign non-communist affidavits. Failure to comply with the
requirements deprived unions of the services which the NLRB might
render. A non-complying union would not have the Board's services
in making an investigation, thus making it impossible to hold an
election and thus precluding certification of the union as an exclusive
bargaining agent for the unit which it sought. If an employer or com-
plying union filed a petition, the NLRB allowed the non-complying
union to be put on the ballot but it could not be certified even if it
won. Moreover, the NLRB would not issue an unfair labor practice
complaint at the request of a non-complying union, but would prose-
cute it for violation of the act.
These sanctions were effective and induced unions to comply with
the filing requirements. No logic exists to demonstrate that they would
not be just as effective if invoked against unions which practice racial
30 Weiss, op. cit. supra note 6, at 474.
37 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Lab. Rel. Rep. (45 Lab. Arb.) 240 (Aug. 13,
1965) ; Master Stevedores Ass'n, 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1168 (Jan. 18, 1966).




discrimination. The NLRB, after being presented with charges of
racial discrimination, would investigate to see if the charges were true.
Representation cases would take place before a hearing officer and
unfair practice proceedings before a trial examiner. Upon finding that
racial discrimination did, in fact, occur, the NLRB would refuse to ac-
cept an election peition from a unit, and refuse to issue a complaint
upon charges of unfair labor practices being committed against it.
Its collective bargaining agreements would no longer be a bar to an
election petition of another union, and it would become subject to
unfair labor practice charges. The offending union would have to clear
itself by proving that it had ended all discriminatory practices.
There is good reason to believe that in the future the Supreme
Court will examine the argument that the fifth amendment is violated
by a federal statute which gives vital protection and benefits to a union,
removes from workers the means to defend themselves, and then
allows the union to violate the worker's rights in contravention of the
Court's pronouncements on public policy of the previous twenty years.
The question does exist, of course, as to whether the unions are "volun-
tary associations," exempt from "interference" of public law. "A legal
incident of treating unions as voluntary associations," Jules Bernstein
has written, "has been the still persistent role that a union may deter-
mine membership qualifications upon any basis which it sees fit, with-
out judicial interference."" Generally, there has been uniform judicial
agreement that a union is a voluntary association free to exclude whom-
ever it wishes from membership. In one 1890 case, Mayer v. Journey-
men Stonecutters Ass'n,4° a state court held that unions are free to
arbitrarily deny admission, and this has been followed in all jurisdic-
tions save one. In response to this decision, some courts developed
the so-called "monopolization" theory, in which a union controlling
employment through closed shop practices "must not exercise their
power in an arbitrary, unreasonable manner so as to bring injury to
others. The nature of the monopoly determines the nature of the
duty."' Under this theory, a union must open its membership to all
workers if they maintain a closed shop monopoly over employment—or
they must abandon the closed shop. As one court stated:
In our opinion, an arbitarily closed or partially closed union
is incompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has . . .
attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed
shop agreements and other forms of *collective labor action,
39 Bernstein, The Right to Join a Union: A Post-Landrum Griffin Appraisal (un-
published paper, at New York University School of Law).
4° 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (1890).
41 Wilson v. Newspaper Deliverers, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 350-51, 197 .AtI. 720, 722
(1938).
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such a union occupies a quasi public position similar to that of
a public service business and it has certain corresponding
obligations. It may no longer claim the same freedom from
legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal associations.
Its asserted right to choose its own members does not merely
relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right
to work for a living.42
However, when an individual excluded from employment in his
trade as a result of closed shop conditions brought suit in federal
court for damages, the case was dismissed, and the court of appeals
affirmed on the ground that the union was a voluntary association
and could freely exclude persons from membership."
IV. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT ON STATE ACTION
The Supreme Court has indicated that union exclusion on grounds
of race may not be sustained where a state statute prohibits such
practices. In Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi," the Court sustained a
New York civil rights statute denying unions the right to exclude from
their membership on grounds of race, color or creed. The appellant
unions claimed that the New York law offended the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and interfered with their right to select
their own membership. The Court answered:
We have here a prohibition of discrimination in membership
or union services on account of race, creed or color. A judicial
determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment would be a destruction of the policy mainifested
in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legis-
lation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of
race or color. We see no constitutional basis for the conten-
tion that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion
solely on the basis of race, color or creed by an organization,
functioning under the protection of the state, which holds
itself out to represent the general business needs of em-
ployees."
The Court, in this case, relied upon the "state agency" status of
unions, viewing them as state instrumentalities because they had
accepted the protection of state labor legislation. Thus, they were sub-
ject to additional state regulation. In this view, the union is regarded
42 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal, 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).
43 Courant v. International Photographers Local, 78 F. Supp. 72 (SD. Cal.
1948); aff'd, 176 F.2d 1000 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950).
44
 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
45 Id. at 93-94.
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as a business affected with the public interest, and hence subject to
state regulation. As one lawyer argues: "The union is just becoming
a public utility of labor relations, circumvented at every point by the
control of the law."" If unions are characterized in this manner, they
are constitutionally bound not to discriminate or segregate and may not
deny membership because they are subject to common law principles.
Other judicial precedents for the right of protection exist in cases
regarding Negro participation in white primaries. The Supreme Court
has held unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting Negro participa-
tion in the state Democratic Party elections.' The Texas Legislature
then tried to empower the Executive Committee of each political party
to establish its own rules of membership qualification as a private
organization, and the Democratic Party then limited membership in
the party to whites only. This decision was invalidated by the Court
on the ground that in exercising a state granted power the Executive
Committee acted as a state agency and had breached its duty under
the fourteenth amendment."
After this decision the Texas Democratic State Convention held
that membership in the Party should be for whites only, precluding
Negro participation. The Court upheld this position in Grovey v.
Townsend," holding that it was not incompatible with the fourteenth
amendment since the party was a voluntary association and the four-
teenth amendment applied only to states. This was subsequently over-
ruled in Smith v. Allwright," in which the Court characterized party
policy as "state action" under the fifteenth amendment because of
the governmental function served by the primary election in Texas
and the supervision of the primary by the state.
Finally, in Terry v. Adams,' a Texas political association con-
ducted a private white primary not governed by state law. The winners
of this election were consistently entered in the official Democratic
county primary, and for more than sixty years had been elected in
that primary and in the general election which followed. Basing its
decision on the ground that the election machinery of the association
and the party had deprived Negroes of the right to vote, the Court
ruled that the action of the association was "state action" for the
purpose of the fifteenth amendment. In other words, the Court held
that a private pre-primary had become such an integral part of the
state's electoral process that exclusion of Negroes from the vote was
48 Tobriner, The Labor Union: Public Utility of Labor Relations, 43 A.BA.j. 805,
808 (1957).
47 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
48 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
49 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
50 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
51 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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a violation of their rights. The atmosphere of legal protection that
pervades union activities should be sufficient' cause to subject union
membership policies to similar constitutional standards.
It may be reasoned that this precedent can be extended to the
domain of trade unionism. When the certified collective bargaining
agent takes advantage of specific powers conferred upon it by the
labor acts, for the purpose of injuring workers on racial grounds, such
action is enjoinable. To allow the power of a federal statute to be
utilized for an end toward which it could not itself be directed would
be to subvert the statute. Since the Railway , Labor Act requires a
carrier to negotiate with the certified representative" and to "exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain .agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules and working conditions,'" and when these establish
a duty to bargain, it is blatantly unconstitutional to enter into . an
agreement racially discriminatory in intent, since the union is armed
with protection and assistance granted under the act, or the Labor
Relations Act and the services of the NLRB.
If one views the union as a private party which secures and
utilizes the services of the state to function, then state nondis-
criminatory requirements are relevant to the union's existence. The
decisions of the Court in Shelley" and Howaid,55 already discussed,
are comparable. One deals with state power arising from decree of a
state court invoked at the request of a litigating party—while the
other deals with state action represented by a statute which is in
constant operation. In both cases failure to stop discriminatory union
practices involved the acquiesence and use of state power in perpetuat-
ing the discrimination. Since all labor management agreements
negotiated by unions under auspices of the Railway Labor Act, the
National Labor Relations Act and their administrative agencies depend
upon the presence of these statutes; no agreement may have racial
discrimination as its purpose or consequence, unless one is to say that
federal laws may be subjected to an unconstitutional purpose.
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
The Court is thus faced with a major decision. The historic racial
practices of the Railroad Brotherhoods clearly indicate that they have
used their power to the great detriment' of Negro workers who came
within their collective bargaining authority." Other groups of unions
52 63 Stat. 909 (1951), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
53
 Ibid.
54 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 30.
55 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.' Howard, supra note 16.
30 For a discussion of the anti-Negro practices of the Railroad Brotherhoods, see
Houston, Foul Employment Practice on the Rails, The Crisis, Oct. 1949; The
Elimination of Negro Firemen on American Railways—A Study of the Evidence Ad-
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currently engage in a variety of discriminatory practices that adversely
affect the economic status of the Negro community." Judicial require-
ment of nondiscrimination is much needed if protection is to be more
than abstract in nature and of minimal value. Extension of the duty
of fair representation, as Sanford Jay Rosen has written, would
strengthen the judicial standard on two levels—by making burden of
proof fall on the union to demonstrate a non-racial reason for exclu-
sion of Negroes, thus legally compelling them to admit otherwise
qualified Negroes. This would have the effect of frequently causing
unions to cease discriminatory job practices. 58
The legality of racial exclusion from unions has not yet been
disposed of by the Court. Because of congressional intent not to
"impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein," 5"
the courts have not acted decisively in this important matter. However,
Title VII, the employment section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
clearly makes exclusion from union membership because of race
unlawful.
It may be anticipated that the courts will extend Steele' or inter-
pret the Labor Management Relations Act in such a manner as to
require that individuals arbitrarily denied membership nevertheless be
accorded membership rights. The basic premise of any fifth or four-
teenth amendment argument is that the action of the state is subject
to constitutional limitations. Inquiry is thus made into the character
and extent of state components. If activity is of a public character,
it is irrelevant to ask whether the state has specifically acted to sanc-
tion discrimination or to empower the discriminating agency to act.
All that must be determined is whether there is discrimination in fact.
Precedent exists to indicate that union activity is of such a govern-
mental character to compel, if necessary, the use of constitutional
obligations. As Summers argues:
Under the National Labor Relations Act and similar state
labor relations acts unions are given broad governmental pro-
tection in their right to organize. The government holds elec-
tions at public expense, it certifies the union as a bargaining
agent, and it compels the employer to bargain with the (duly
duced at the Hearing Before the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices,
4 Law. Guild Rev. 32 (1944); Cayton & Mitchell, Black Workers and the New .Unions
439-45 (1939).
57 See, e.g., Hill, The Negro Wage-earner and Apprenticeship Training Programs
(NAACP Publication 1959).
59
 Rosen, The Negro in the American Labor Movement 29 (unpublished divisional
paper at Public Law Division, Yale School of Law).
59
 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), as amended, 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(h)(1)(A) (1964).
en Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 7.
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chosen) representative. The trade agreement when made
binds all of the employees in the unit, and is enforced by
governmental sanctions. This is all done for the express
purpose of insuring the free flow of commerce and promoting
the public welfare by obtaining peaceful settlements of labor
disputes. This legislative granting of power to labor unions
to effect proper legislative objectives by clothing the unions
with official protection and designation, may be enough to
constitute their conduct governmental action."
The various cases discussed in this paper have been examined
to demonstrate that the extensive context of statutory protection
in which labor unions function, constitutes the basis for private
activity with broad public consequences. The social effect is comparable
to governmental action. When government control is of a broad nature
and when sanction makes it impossible to discern that conduct is of a
private origin, the Court has held that such activities are subject to the
obligation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. To allow unions to
engage in racial exclusion and related practices would be tantamount to
ignoring the thrust of Shelley. Discrimination by labor unions is not dif-
ferent in its social consequences because the discrimination itself lacks
affirmative government sanction. The state is involved because it grants
power, without which the discriminatory practices could not occur.
Unions are already empowered to exercise effective control over
large numbers of workers. This is due to statutory protection. Al-
though they are not given the right to discriminate racially, they have
in effect been empowered by the state to discriminate. Thus, racial
discrimination by unions may be regarded as state action under the
Shelley doctrine. American labor unions, traditionally regarded as
private associations, have in fact become public in character. Their
activities are public and relevant to the needs of those they affect
and, hence, the fourteenth amendment must apply to them. If dis-
crimination as to membership is controlled, the necessity for more
government intervention would decrease. Admitted into union member-
ship, the Negro would at least have the opportunity to work for his
own interest within the internal political structure. At the same time,
the international union might gain the support of membership for
corrective control over locals. Thus, if the law intervenes at this
point, it may be able to withdraw at a later one.
A. Hughes Tool: The Turning Point
In December 1962 the NLRB, in Pioneer Bus Co.," ruled that if
a labor union's contract with a company sanctions discrimination, an-
81 Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 33, 56 (1947).
82 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
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other union is free at any time to seek the right to represent the com-
pany's workers. This modified the "contract bar" rule preventing
efforts of raiding unions. The Pioneer Bus Company of Houston had a
five year contract with one union. The company had a two unit bar-
gaining relationship, one with an all-white local and the other with a
Negro local. In contract negotiations the employer met separately with
the two units and wrote separate contracts, with separate seniority lists
for white and Negro workers.
In line with court decisions condemning government sanction of
racially separate groups as inherently discriminatory, the NLRB said
it "will not permit its contract bar rules to be utilized to shield con-
tracts' promoting racist practices. " LW] here the bargaining repre-
sentative of employees in an appropriate unit executes separate con-
tracts, or even a single contract, discriminating between Negro and
white employees on racial lines, the Board will not deem such contracts
as a bar to an election." The Board also noted that execution of
contracts of this nature were in "patent derogation of the certifica-
tion"' given them as exclusive agent, and revocation was threatened
for the first time.
Finally, the NLRB dealt with the basic issue when on July 1, 1964
they ruled in the Hughes Tool Co." case that discrimination by labor
unions is an unfair labor practice. For the first time in the history of the
NLRB, the Board ruled that racial discrimination by a union in mem-
bership practices—such as exclusion or segregation of Negroes—is a
violation of the duty of fair representation under Section 9(a) of the
NLRA. Consequently, a new principle in administrative labor law was
established that will have far reaching consequences if sustained by the
federal courts.
In this case, involving Negro workers at the Hughes Tool Com-
pany in Houston, Texas, all jobs were racially classified and Negro
workers held only the lowest paying positions. The union was segre-
gated into white and colored locals and the collective bargaining agree-
ment provided for separate Negro and white seniority lines of promo-
tion. These separate racial seniority lines prevented Negro workers
from entering into desirable higher paying job classifications.
During February 1962 the company had posted a bid for appren-
tice application within the plant. Ivory Davis, a Negro employee since
1942, filed an application for admission into the company sponsored
apprenticeship training course. He met all of the qualifications, but the
job for which he requested training fell within the category reserved
65
 Id. at 55.
•	 64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Independent Metal Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
647
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
for white workers exclusively, by virtue of the agreement with the
white local. He was denied admission into the .training program and
the union refused to process his grievance.
At the request of Local 2, the NAACP entered the case on October
4, 1962, and filed a motion with the NLRB asking that Local l's
certification be rescinded.
In a brief entered amicus curiae by the American Civil Liberties
Union, the ACLU urged the Board to interpret the NLRA as making it
an unfair labor practice "for an exclusive bargaining representative to
discriminate against Negroes in respect to membership in the union or
representation." They urged that the Board "decertify any union which
the Board has reason to believe will in the future discriminate.'
The ACLU reasoned that discrimination by a union constitutes an
unfair labor practice under the NLRA, and, therefore, the failure of a
union to represent its members without regard to race is per se an
unfair practice. The ACLU concluded that under Sections 8 (b) (1) (A)
and 8(b) (2), (3) of the National Labor Relation's Act any collective
bargaining representative must be required to admit all workers in the
unit to union membership on a nonsegregated basis without discrimina-
tion because of race, or forfeit its right to serve as such a representative.
Moreover, the ACLU amicus brief cited the applicability of court
decisions on the bargaining duty of unions functioning under the Rail-
way Labor Act to the NLRB. In each case cited by the ACLU, the
courts have held that the duty to bargain collectively encompassed the
duty not to discriminate.
B. Hughes Tool: Future Ramifications
The Hughes Tool Co. case represents a fundamental turning
point in the Board's slow evolution to an affirmative policy in pro-
tecting the rights of Negro workers. In this case the Board not only
invoked the Pioneer Bus d6ctrine by unanimously deciding that "the
certification issued jointly to . . . [thie segregated local unions] be
rescinded because the certified organizations executed contracts based
on race and administered the contracts so as to perpetuate racial dis-
crimination in employment,'" 8 but most significantly a majority of the
Board went beyond the Pioneer Bus doctrine to invoke Shelley v.
Kraemer and related decisions:
Specifically, we hold that the Board cannot validly render aid
under Section 9 of the Act to a labor organization which dis-
criminates racially when acting as a statutory bargaining rep-
resentative. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1; Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497.
67 Amicus curiae brief for American Civil Liberties Union, ibid.
68 147 N.L.R.B. at 1577.
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We hold too, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, *
 that
the certification should be rescinded because ... the segre-
gated locals] discriminated on the basis of race in determining
eligibility for full and equal membership, and segregated their
members on the basis of race. In the light of the Supreme
Court decisions cited herein and others to which the Board
adverted in Pioneer Bus, we hereby expressly overrule such
cases as Atlantic Oak Flooring Company, 62 NLRB 973;
Larus & Brother Company, 62 NLRB 1075; and other cases
epitomized by the language of the Board's Tenth Annual
Report . . insofar as such cases hold that unions which
exclude employees from membership on racial grounds, or
which classify or segregate members on racial grounds, may
obtain or retain certified status under the Act."
The NLRB had already ruled in 1962 that discrimination by a
union against an employee, affecting terms and conditions of employ-
ment, could constitute an unfair practice subject to the Board's juris-
diction." What the Board did in Hughes Tool was to rule that the
refusal of a union to process a worker's grievance because he was a
Negro is an unfair labor practice subject to established legal remedy.
Labor union leaders expressed the fear of a flood of litigation by mem-
bers who felt aggrieved on many matters other than racial questions.
For the first time then, the NLRB ruled that discrimination by a
union in membership policies is a violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation under Section 9(a) of the NLRA. Before this decision, only
discrimination in bargaining was regarded as a violation of a union's
duty toward the employees it represents. The Board accepted the
NAACP's argument that racial membership policies and practices are
the cause of unfair treatment. The Association argued that racial dis-
crimination by labor unions leads to the establishment of racial criteria
in job assignment and the fact that Negroes have no voice in the
formulation of collective bargaining agreements leads to discrimination
in bargaining and contract administration.
This decision has broad implications for organized labor. The
issues go far beyond the matter of eliminating racial discrimination;
the question of a union's duty to represent fairly all employees in the
bargaining unit for which it is the certified bargaining agent is sharply
raised.
The point is that a union cannot represent fairly employees whom
it excludes from membership on racial grounds. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.,
writes:
69 Id. at 1577-78.
70 Pioneer Bus Co., supra note 62.
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One's initial reaction to this problem, is that it is a clear
violation of the due process clause for Congress to create
machinery under which the bargaining agent becomes the
exclusive representative of each and every worker in the unit
and yet permits that bargaining agent to exclude from mem-
bership, on grounds of color, a part of those represented."
Thus, the statutory duty of fair representation should be inter-
preted to require unions to admit Negro workers to membership on an
equal basis or that all-white unions stop serving as statutory exclusive
bargaining representatives. Exclusion from membership per se is a
denial of fair representation. Membership in the union is the pre-
requisite that permits the employee to participate in negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining contracts. If he is not a union
member, he can not be fairly represented since the union does not
permit him a voice in its decisions.
The only case which squarely holds that a certified union is re-
quired by the fifth amendment to admit Negroes is Betts v. Easley."
The court then said:
The acts complained of are those of an organization acting as
an agency created and functioning under provisions of Fed-
eral law. . . . While claiming and exercising rights incident to
its designation as bargaining agent, the defendant union can-
not at the same time avoid the responsibilities that attach to
such statutory status. . . 73
The Betts case properly evaluates the law. If the NLRB certifies
a union and does not police it to prevent discrimination, it violates the
fifth amendment. The NLRB, therefore, is required to refuse to certify
a union which bars Negroes or is engaged in other discriminatory prac-
tices. Furthermore, it has the responsibility to supervise its certification
to prevent such discrimination and it has a duty prior to certifying a
union to make certain that it is not constituted to deny fair representa-
tion to all workers in the unit.
The direct attack by Negro civil rights organizations against the
discriminatory racial practices of the craft unions touches upon the
basic source of power of many craft unions, the power that accrues
because of job control. This power is obtained by virtue of exclusive
union hiring hall agreements and by imposing union control over ad-
mission to the craft via apprenticeship and other forms of training;
most significantly membership has been made into a condition of em-
ployment. This control, which is frequently used to exclude Negroes as
71 Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 Lab. L. J. 874, 875 (1957).
72 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
73 Id. at 468-69, 169 P.2d at 838-39.
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a class from union membership, therefore denying Negroes access to
employment opportunities, is vigorously guarded by AFL-CIO leaders
as the basis of "union security." Thus, they fear that the civil rights
groups are touching "at the very roots of their power.""
However, neither the NAACP nor the ACLU have called for de-
certification as a first step to eliminate anti-Negro practices by labor
unions but only as a final remedy, especially where Negro workers
require potential union protection against employer-based discrimina-
tion. An effective initial remedy would be the issuance of an order
requiring unions, as a condition of continued certification, to admit
Negroes and to stop discriminatory practices, plus a stipulation that
they offer back pay to workers who suffered losses as a result of dis-
crimination. Under existing statutes the NLRB has full power to grant
such remedies, if it so desires.
The Board's issuance of cease and desist orders precluding unions
from making race or union membership a condition of job referral is a
further indication of the Board's new approach in this area. In Master
Stevedores," the NLRB continued along the path begun in Hughes
Tool and held that International Longshoremen's Association Local
872 and employer-members of two employer association groups in
the port of Houston, Texas violated the act by establishing and main-
taining discriminatory hiring practices based on membership and
non-membership in the ILA local. The Board also found that Local
872 alone violated the act by applying its seniority system in a
discriminatory manner giving preference to union over non-union long-
shoremen dispatched for work through the union hiring hall. Hiring
through the Local 872 hiring hall was done at a daily shape-up by gang
foremen and assistant gang foremen selected by the employer from
membership lists provided by the union.
The NLRB observed that the union and the employer associations
were parties to a contract in which the employers agreed to hire all
Negro longshoremen employed in the loading and unloading of deep
sea vessels through a hiring hall operated and administered by the
union "irrespective of union affiliation!'" It was determined that the
union later established a classification system which caused the em-
ployers to discriminate against certain longshoremen.
Tile Board concluded that the union applied its seniority system in
a discriminatory manner through the operation of the union hiring
hall and thereby caused 'non-union longshoremen to be discriminated
against in violation of sections 8(b) (2) and (1) (a).
Current developments thus suggest that the goal of fair represen-
74 Pomfret, Unions & Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1964, p. 5.
75 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1168 (Jan. 18, 1966).
76 Id. at 1168.
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tation and equal treatment sought by the plaintiffs in the Steele and
Tunstall cases more than twenty years ago may be realized in the near
future. This will be achieved by establishing in the law the doctrine
that segregation and discrimination based on race when engaged in by
a statutory bargaining representative is inherently an unfair and un-
equal practice and that such practices constitute unlawful representa-
tion.
It may be anticipated that increasing attacks by Negro workers
upon discriminatory practices through the NLRB and utilization of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in addition to litigation in both fed-
eral and state courts will have far reaching effects upon both employers
and labor unions, indeed, upon the whole structure of established labor
relations in the "United States.
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